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Multinational Enterprise Parent Liability: Efficient
Legal Regimes in a World Market Environment
Karl Hofstetter*
[T]he understandingof lawyers as to the characteristicsof the MNE [multinationalenterprise]is often unsophisticatedand erroneous,for there has been
no merger between law and economics. I
I.

Introduction: The Bhopal Case as an Example

The topic of multinational enterprise (MNE) parent liability
emerges if the assets of a MNE subsidiary in a host country are insufficient to satisfy all creditor claims. It raises the question of parent
company responsibility for the outstanding liabilities or debts of its
subsidiary. This issue stood at the core of the Bhopal case.
The Bhopal case arose out of a chemical catastrophe at a Union
Carbide subsidiary plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984. The survivors of
the Bhopal disaster and the successors to more than 3,000 deceased
alleged claims of $3.3 billion (U.S.) against Union Carbide. Union
Carbide's Indian subsidiary had assets of less than $100 million
(U.S.). 2 Consequently, plaintiffs brought suit against both the Indian
subsidiary and the U.S. parent of Union Carbide. The trial court dismissed the action against the parent company in the United States
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 3 The trial continued
4
in India and was recently settled for the sum of $470 million (U.S.).
The plaintiffs' complaint in the United States set forth a theory
* Legal Counsel to the Schindler Corp., Switzerland and a member of the Swiss and
New York Bars. The author wishes to thank Harvard Law School, in particular Prof. Vagts,
Dean Clark, Prof. Kraakman, Vice Dean Smith and Prof. Shavell for their interest in his
research on multinational enterprises and the many important comments received from

them in connection with this article. A special tribute goes to the Swiss National Research
Fund for financing his stay at Harvard in 1988-89.
1 Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise: A New Challengefor TransnationalLaw, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 739, 744 (1970).
2 Hillman, Multinational Enterprise Liability for UltrahazardousActivities, 15 INT'L Bus.
Law. 66, 67 (1987).
3 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd and modified 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
4 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989 § A, at 1, col. 1. Individual plaintiffs contested the settlement before the Indian Supreme Court, contending that the Indian government, which
represented all plaintiffs "parens patrie," settled for too small an amount. See N.Y. Times,
April 1, 1989, § D, at 44, col. 4; N.Y. Times, March 4, 1989, § D, at 38, col. 6.
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of "multinational enterprise liability."' 5 It called for joint liability of
all affiliates of "monolithic" MNEs for damages arising out of ultrahazardous activities. 6 The Indian courts, however, which finally
handled the case, approached the matter based on more conventional Indian law. In an intermediate judgment, the Indian High
Court of Madhya Pradesh held the parent company tentatively liable
for $190 million (U.S.) 7 based on the doctrine of piercing the corpo-

rate veil. The court used this theory because of the perceived control by Union Carbide Corporation over the composition of the
board of directors and the management of its Indian subsidiary.8
Had a final judgment been rendered by the Indian courts against the
parent of Union Carbide, the question of its enforcement in the
United States would almost certainly have become a hotly contested
issue. 9
The Bhopal case demonstrated the various facets of MNE parent
liability. 10 It revealed the level of emotions and the number of issues
associated with the problem of MNE parent liability. It stirred questions about appropriate jurisdiction, choice of law, enforcement of
foreign judgments, and, most of all, proper substantive parent liability standards. "
In this Article I approach the MNE parent liability topic, exemplified by the Bhopal case, from an efficiency perspective. I show
that measuring MNE liability problems with the yardstick of International Social Efficiency (ISE) is appropriate and allows for coherent
5 Count one of the Complaint by the Union of India against Union Carbide Corp.,
filed with the United States District Court, S.D.N.Y., April 8, 1985, 85 Civ. 2696.
6 Id.

7 Order ofJudge Deo, Dist.Judge of Bhopal, Dec. 17, 1987, aff'd and modified, High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Apr. 4, 1988, Civil Revision 26/88. The order was appealed to
the Indian Supreme Court, where the settlement occured. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985,
§ A, at 1, col. 1.
8 See Item 14 of the High Court Judgment. The court did not consider dispositive
the fact that Union Carbide Corporation owned only 50.9% of the stock of its Indian subsidiary. See also U.S. Company Said to Have Had Control in Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985,
§ A, at 7, col. 1.
9 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197-206 (3d Cir.
1987) (discussing the plant disaster in connection with forum non conveniens). For a discussion of different layers of the MNE parent liability problem see D. VAGTS, ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL PARENT LIABILITY EXPOSURE

181 (1988); P. BLUMBERG,

CORPORATE GROUPS

AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF SUBSIDIARIES § 10.01

(1986).
Io D. VACTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 141-42 (1986) [hereinafter VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS]; Kolvenbach, European Reflections on Bhopal and the Consequences
for TransnationalCorporations, 14 INT'L BUS. LAW. 357, 357-362 (1986); The Bhopal Tragedy:
Social and Legal Issues, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 267 (1985).
11 See generally Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an
International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321 (1985); Hillman, supra note 2, at 66-70;
Seward, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company Liability, 21 INT'L LAW. 695 (1987);
Kolvenbach, Bhopal-The Storm Over the Multinationals?, 1 ZErTSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS
UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 47-69 (1986).
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normative conclusions about the entire subject. I -argue that limited
liability for subsidiary corporations is a second best solution to internalize political risks that are more efficiently borne by host country
societies than by MNEs. However, I also point out that there are
three categories of efficient exceptions to the limited liability of subsidiary corporations, and that they have already started to evolve in
various forms. I make an attempt to integrate choice of law and procedural law into the efficiency model for MNE parent liability law. I
posit that host country law and host country courts are basically the
most efficient choices with regard to the liability control of MNE host
country activities. But home country checks on host country legislators and courts may efficiently supplement this scheme. In my conclusion, I stress that the efficiency analysis of MNE liability law
reveals the contractual nature of MNE parent liability regimes in host
countries, and that their unilateral change by actors such as host
country courts will not and should not be free of charge if this
amounts to an inefficient "breach of contract" by the host country
vis-a-vis the MNE.
II. International Social Efficiency and the Formation of
Multinational Enterprise Liability Regimes
For purposes of discussing parent liability arrangements, the
MNE can be defined as consisting of a parent company in one country, the home country, and a subsidiary company in another country,
the host country. 12 The parent-subsidiary structure has obvious efficiency advantages over alternatives such as licensing, trade, subcontracting, or portfolio investments. The replacement of market
relationships by hierarchy can save significant transaction costs.' 3 In
particular, group integration helps internalize the positive externalities stemming from the exchange of intangible assets in opportunistic international markets.' 4 The MNE structure has, therefore, been
a most proper fit for the international transfer of privately owned
capital and technology.
As a result, the MNE has assumed an increasingly crucial role in
world economic affairs. 15 It serves as the major vehicle for the effi12 See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1987); Hadari,
The Structure of the Private MultinationalEnterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729 (1973).
13 O. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 273 (1985); R.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (1988); Hart, An Economist's Perspective
on the Theory of the Firm (1989) (Discussion Paper No. 51, Harvard Law School Program in
Law and Economics).
14 See R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3-5 (1982); N.
HOOD & S. YOUNG, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 56 (1979).

15 See Newfarmer, Multinationals and Marketplace Magic in the 1980s, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE 1980's 162 (C. Kindleberger & D. Audretsch eds. 1983);
Vernon, Future of the MultinationalEnterprise, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION: A SYM-
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cient movement .of information and expertise, for example, along
changing product cycles.' 6 It thereby contributes to the exploitation
of potential "world cosmopolitan gains"' 17 comparable to international trade. The consensus regarding the efficiency of international
trade has lead to the establishment of an international legal framework through the GATT. 8 No comparable body of international law
for direct investment exists.19 But foreign direct investment and international trade are partially mutual substitutes in that they both
carry a potential for the promotion of efficient world production.
Hence, they can both be explained as functions of International So20
cial Efficiency (ISE).
The idea of ISE has helped in formulating the concept of "optimal tariffs" in the area of international trade. 2 1 In much the same
way ISE can be expected to lend itself towards the development of a
POSIUM 382 (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970). See also Nye, The Multinational Corporation in the
1980s, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE 1980's 2 (C. Kindleberger & D. Au-

dretsch eds. 1983).

16 J. BARTON & B. FISCHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT: REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 19 (1986); R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL
ISSUE 39 (1977).
17 World cosmopolitan gains are utility increases through world production as seen

from the perspective of the world as a whole. See P. LINDERT & C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 448 (7th ed. 1982).
18 BARTON & FISCHER, supra note 16, at 142-68, 453-91; VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 10, at 3-29.
19 Numerous bilateral investment treaties, for example, the International Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), supplemented by a recent Multilateral
Investment Guaranty Agreement (MIGA), and various guidelines for MNE by the OECD
and the ILO, build a rather fragmented international law structure for international direct
investment. It is noteworthy, however, that investment issues, like trade related investment measures (TRIMs), are now for the first time also a subject at the ongoing GATT
negotiations in the Uruguay Round. Whether this marks the beginning of a development
towards a "GATT for Investment" remains to be seen.
For a discussion of the present international legal structure for direct investment see
BARTON & FISCHER, supra note 16, at 749-922; C. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: NATIONAL REGULATORY TECHNIQUES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONTROLS
(1983); J. LAVIEC, PROTECTION ET PROMOTION DES
INVESTISSEMENTS: ETUDE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE (1985); G. AKSEN, THE
CASE FOR BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 357-81 (1981); J.
RUBIN & G. HUFBAUER, EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT,
MULTINATIONAL CODES AND CORPORATE CONDUCT (1984); Shihata, Factors Influencing the

Flow of Foreign Investment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme, 21
INT'L LAW. 671 (1987); I. SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ORIGINS, OPERATIONS, POLICIES, AND BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE
AGENCY (1988); Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of
ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1 (1986).

For information dealing with the prospects for future international regulations of foreign direct investment issues see Kindleberger & Goldberg, Toward a GA TTfor Investment:
A ProposalforSupervision of the InternationalCorporation,2 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 295 (1970);
Pope, TransnationalCorporations-TheUnited Nations Code of Conduct, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
129, 131-53 (1979); Roffe, Transfer of Technology: UNCTAD's Draft InternationalCode of Conduct, 19 INT'L LAw. 689, 693-98 (1985); CAVES, supra note 14, at 295-99; LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17, at 477-78.
20 See infra note 30.
21 LINDERT

& KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17, at 468-69.
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concept of "optimal MNE liability regimes" in the area of international direct investment.
A.

The Positive Role of InternationalSocial Efficiency in the
Formation of Multinational Enterprise Liability Regimes

MNE investment arrangements are made in a world market environment. On one side MNEs and home countries are looking for a
maximum share in the returns on MNE host country investments.
Their rational objectives are profit maximization and risk limitation.
On the other side of the transaction host countries and their constituents are also striving for maximal shares in the value created by
MNE host country investments. They likewise seek a minimization of
their own risk exposure.
Specifically, opportunities and risks associated with MNE investments in host countries are allocated through four principal relationships. These relationships are between: the MNE and its home
country; the MNE and the host country; the MNE and its host country stakeholders (creditors); and the home and host countries
directly.
Liability regimes are an important component of the risk arrangements for MNE activities in host countries. They are first and
foremost set between the MNE and the official host country. 2 2 A key
ingredient of the host country offer to MNE investors is the host
country's liability law. Liability standards applicable to the MNE can
be negotiated explicitly, 23 but they are more likely to be accepted by
the MNE as a contract of adhesion. In either case, rational MNE investors will account for host country liability regimes as an expected
cost factor when making their investment decisions. 24 Rational host
22 See Ocran, The Process and Outcome of Negotiations with Multinational Corporations: A
Conceptual Framework for Analysis, 18 AKRON L. REV. 405, 410-11 (1985); Vagts, The Host
Countty Faces the MNE, 53 B.U.L. REV. 261, 271 (1973).
Chronologically, the initial negotiation occurs between the MNE and its home country
(including the MNE stakeholders in the home country). The interests of the home country
and the MNE in limiting MNE liability exposure in the host country are, however, practically congruent. This explains why the MNE is given broad authority to deal with the host
country on its own.
To be sure, conflicts of interest between the home country and the MNE can exist on
the more fundamental level of whether to allow the outflow of domestic capital in the first
place. Balance of payments concerns might call for some restrictions. For this reason,
capital export restrictions were imposed in the United States during the Vietnam period.
Similarly the interest in keeping jobs in the home country might create labor opposition
against foreign direct investment outflows from home countries. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17, at 459, 475.
23 See generally Schanze, Investitionsvertrdgeim Internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, 9 STUDIEN
ZUM INTERNATIONALEN ROHSTOFFRECHT (1986); D. SMITH & L. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD
WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS (1975) (regarding specifically negotiated investment contracts between MNE and host countries).
24 The liability risk is part of the investment climate in a host country. See Stobaugh,
How to Analyze Foreign Investment Climates, 47 HARV. Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1969, at 100; Rum-
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countries will likewise include their offered liability regimes in their
own social cost/benefit analysis of MNE investment projects.2 5 As a
result competition among host countries on one side and the MNE
on the other will tend to push the liability regimes negotiated be26
tween the MNE and host countries toward ISE.

To be sure, the MNE/host country market has its imperfections.
High transaction costs generally prohibit bothproject-specific liability arrangements and creditor-specific liability rules. Fraud and opportunism either by the MNE (e.g., incorporation fraud) or the host
countries (e.g., arbitrary expansion of a limited liability doctrine by
host country courts) can undermine the liability arrangements set in
the MNE/host country market. Neglecting third country interests in
the formation of liability regimes or systematic political and legal discrimination by host countries against certain creditor groups such as
employees or tort creditors 2 7 can produce externalities. Such discrimination might even spur an inefficient race for the bottom
among host nations.
These imperfections are addressed in various ways. The high
transaction costs of negotiating individual liability regimes favor the
unilateral drafting of liablilty laws by host countries. Fraudulent
MNE abuses of the limited liability principle for host country subsidiaries can be tackled by providing for adequate rules for piercing the
corporate veil. The potential for host country opportunism in the
application and development of liability laws can be countered by
limiting the reach of host country law and the role of host country
courts. Where third countries are affected by activities of the MNE
(e.g., through the sale of products from the host country subsidiary to
third country constituents), they can claim jurisdictional and regulamel & Heenan, How MultinationalsAnalyze PoliticalRisks, 56 HARV. Bus. REv.Jan.-Feb. 1978,
at 67.
25 Encarnation & Wells, Evaluating Foreign Investment, in INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT:
NEW

ROLES

FOR

PRIVATE

CAPITAL

61-86

(T.

Moran

ed.

1986).

See R.

BARRO,

MACROECONOMICS (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the interrelationship between microeconomic
facts and macroeconomic planning).
26 See Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985) (law as a product adjusting to market pressures); Romano, The State Competition Debate in CorporateLaw (1987) (Discussion Paper No. 30, Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics).
For a discussion of the doubts raised concerning the impact of legal changes on shareholder reactions see generally Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: Study of
Investor's Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551 (1987). This still
leaves open the question of managers' reactions to such changes-managers might indeed
be more sensitive to changes in corporate law than investors.
27 This touches upon the inefficiencies stemming from suboptimal political structures, which have been dealt with most thoroughly, in a general way, by the public choice
theorists. See Buchanan, Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems, in THEORY OF PUBLIC
CHOICE: POLITICAL APPLICATION OF ECONOMICS 11-27 U. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds.
1972); Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its
Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II 12-13 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds. 1984).
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tory powers, thereby avoiding the potential-'of unwelcome
externalities.
In addition, the imperfections in the MNE/host country market
favor supplementary markets such as MNE/creditor markets and
regulatory markets among nation states. The host country can delegate rulemaking power to the MNE/creditor markets. It will do so
where it expects that individual (or organized) creditors are able to
negotiate more efficient (case-specific) liability regimes with a MNE.
Host country law in the areas of substantive liability law, jurisdiction,
and choice of law will, therefore, provide for mere default rules.
Equally, imperfections in the MNE/host country market can activate a regulatory market among home, host, and possibly third countries. The coordination of MNE liability matters through
international law can promote efficiency. It helps ease the conflict
between overlapping regulatory claims of different national legal systems. It can likewise work towards preventing opportunism by either
home, host, or third countries in the use of their legal powers. International agreement on liability floors is another potentially efficient
device. Such a standard allows for the protection of easily defrauded
or suppressed creditor segments in host countries. 2 8 This could in
fact alleviate the danger of an inefficient race for the bottom among
29
host countries.
Thus, world market forces, i.e., the rational utility-maximizing
conduct of the actors involved in the formation of MNE liability regimes, will tend to push MNE liability arrangements towards ISE.
The MNE/host country market is the principal level for coordination, but it is supplemented efficiently by MNE/creditor markets and
the regulatory market among nation states.
B.

The Normative Role of InternationalSocial Efficiency in the
Formation of MultinationalEnterprise Liability Regimes

In principle the development of MNE liability regimes towards
ISE is ultimately in the best interests of all concerned. No rational
economic actor is against exploiting economic opportunities that
would, on balance, make it at least no worse off.30
There are, thus, two reasons for those involved in the formation
28 See Hofstetter & Klubeck, Accomodating Labor and Community Interests in Mass Dismissals: A TransnationalApproach, 9 INDUS. REL. LJ. 451, 488-96 (1987).
29 Of course, constitutional law reforms and other internal measures in the respective
countries could be a more appropriate and more efficient countermeasure against such
distortions. They might, however, not be realizable through outside pressure, rendering
international liability floors an efficient second best solution.
30 ISE is understood in this paper along the "Kaldor-Hicks" concept of efficiency, i.e.,
a rule is efficient if its gains to some actors exceed its losses to others. The compensation
of the losers by the winners is not dealt with here, but is, nevertheless, assumed to happen.
See Coleman, Effciency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 512, 518-26
(1980).
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of MNE liability regimes to establish rules consistent with ISE. First,
to the extent that world markets push towards ISE, actors (e.g., host
countries) that refuse to follow the signals of ISE will be charged a
premium. Second, the "no losers" potential of ISE makes its pursuit
an uncritical goal, at least for utility-maximizing actors. Of course,
differing distributional preferences could diffuse the notion of ISE,
making it a far less operable vehicle for normative purposes. Yet,
assuming that liability laws are an inefficient means of redistribution, 3 1 distributional concerns can be neglected for the purposes of
this Article.
I1. Substantive Multinational Enterprise Liability Rules as a
Reflection of an Efficient Allocation of Investment-Related
Powers and Risks
A.

The Efficiency Merits of Limited Liabilityfor Host Country
Subsidiaries
1. TraditionalEfficiency Explanationsfor Limited Liability

Limited liability, including limited liability for subsidiary corporations, is in principle recognized by all market-oriented legal systems around the world.3 2 Historically, corporate limited liability was
perceived as a spur to socially desirable investment,3 3 but the empirical evidence about its positive macroeconomic impact has been inconclusive.3 4 Only theoretical analysts have made a plausible case for
the efficiency of limited liability. Posner maintains that limited liability is an efficient default rule because it arguably reflects the typical
35
risk-bearing advantages of creditors over public shareholders.
Others emphasize the crucial transaction cost saving role of limited
liability in primary and secondary equity markets. 3 6 Limited liability
31 M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 105 (1983).
32 See generally ORGANIZATION

(OECD),

FOR ECONOMIC

COOPERATION AND

DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY OF

PARENT COMPANIES FOR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES (1980); P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS, BANKRUPTCY LAW 605 (1985) [hereinafter BLUMBERG I]. The Republic of China,
too, now recognizes the principle of limited liability for foreign corporate investments.

Zheng, Business Organizationand Securities Law of the People's Republic of Chinafor Sino Foreign.
Stock Companies, 43 Bus. LAW. 595 (1988).
33 P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER
COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 7-9 (1987) [hereinafter BLUMBERG II]; Hicks, Limited Liability: The Pros and
Cons, in LIMrrED LIABILrrY AND THE CORPORATION 11, 12 (T. Orhnial ed. 1982);J. DAVIS,
CORPORATIONS 26 n.3 (1961).

34 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at 35-36; Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in
American Industry, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1366-73 (1948); Meiners, Mofsky & Tollision,
Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 359-67 (1979); Forbes, Limited
Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation,2J. LAW. ECON. & ORG. 163, 164-66

(1986).
35 See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 499,
501-09 (1976) [hereinafter Posner, Corporations].
36 See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corpo-
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limits the cost to shareholders of monitoring management and other
shareholders. Additionally, it permits better diversification on the
part of shareholders and allows for a relatively inexpensive way to
trade shares. Therefore, it promotes the operation of highly liquid
securities markets. This in turn contributes to lower costs of
37
capital.
It is quite plausible that a statutory limited liability rule is efficient as between a dispersed body of individual shareholders and
proficient financial creditors such as banks. These creditors are
likely to be the superior bearers of at least certain risks associated
with the activities of their corporate debtor. Compared to an individual public shareholder such financial creditors are often better
able to monitor the activities of a corporation. They will also tend to
be better diversified and, thus, less risk averse than public shareholders. Moreover, such creditors are usually compensated for bearing
limited liability risks. Furthermore, given the default character of the
limited liability rule, contract creditors will be able to negotiate
around limited liability where it is efficient to do so. 3 8 Doubts about
this efficiency explanation for the limited liability rule arise, however,
39
if either the shareholder or creditor paradigms are changed.
Because a parent company is significantly more aware of the
risks stemming from its subsidiary's activities it is a better monitor of
such risks; it also tends to be less risk averse than an individual shareholder. 40 The fact that the role of equity markets is of little importance where parents hold 100% of the subsidiary
stock also weakens
4
the case for limited liability of subsidiaries. '
Likewise, an individual tort creditor having no contractual relations with a corporation will tend to be a poorer monitor of the corporation than a bank creditor. Unlike the latter it will not be
compensated for assuming limited liability risks, and it will not be
able to contract around the limited liability rule in cases where that
would be efficient. In fact, there appears to be agreement in the
legal literature that limited liability creates economic deadweight
losses through its uncompensated risk externalization to certain
ration Law, 30 U. ToRoNrro L.J. 117, 131-45 (1980); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability
and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 89, 98-104 (1985).
37 See contra Meiners, Mefsky & Tollision, supra note 34, at 351.
38 Posner, Corporations,supra note 35, at 503.
39 BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, §§ 4.03.1-.2, at 74-80, 5.01-.02, at 93-101.
40 A parent company's lesser risk aversion is due to the fact that its shareholders are
still protected by its own limited liability shield; that gives the ultimate shareholders the
opportunity to diversify themselves independent of the parent's responsibility for subsidiary corporations.
41 Some positive effects of limited liability on equity markets will admittedly still exist
where a parent does not own all the stock of a subsidiary corporation. Even where a parent owns 100% of a subsidiary, limited liability can save transaction costs in sales of subsidiary stocks because it will ease the separation of liabilities as between a parent and its
subsidiary.
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creditors. 42 The situation is particularly grave as between corporate
parents and tort creditors of a subsidiary. 43 Thus, applying the same
strict limited liability rule to all shareholder/creditor scenarios creates undesirable social cost. It would only be efficient to incur these
costs if they are outweighed by the social cost of designing and operating a more differentiated or a different statutory liability regime.
This question seems to be the crux in the discussion over the
limited liability rule. On one side are those who advocate the abolition or correction of limited liability for corporate parents in general, 4 4 or vis-a-vis tort creditors in particular. 45 This argument
stresses the social cost of limited liability. On the other hand are
46
those expressing doubts about a differentiated limited liability rule.
They emphasize the social cost of tinkering with the principle of limited liability, referring to the impossibility of properly distinguishing
between various situations, the potentially higher cost of litigation
arising from legal differentiations, and the distortions caused by discriminating between, for example, individual and' corporate
47
shareholders.
These recent theoretical discussions notwithstanding, limited liability has never been put to a basic test with regard to its justification in the parent/subsidiary context. The principle originated in a
world without corporate groups and was later applied mechanically
to subsidiary corporations. No due regard was given to the basic differences between individual and corporate shareholders.48 As Professor Phillip Blumberg noted
Both as an academic and a political matter, the application of
limited liability to corporate groups has never undergone the scrutiny and debate that such a fundamental extension of the doctrine
deserves. With the increasing predominance of large corporate
groups on the world economic scene, and the increasing emergence
of an interdependent world economic
order, such re-examination is
49
not only desirable, but inevitable.
42 See Posner, Corporations,.supra note 35, at 520; Halpem, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 36, at 147-149; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36, at 103-104; BLUMBERG II,

supra note 33, §§ 4.03.1-.2, at 74-80.
43 Stone, The Placeof EnterpriseLiability in the Controlof CorporateConduct, 90 YALE LJ. 1,
65-77 (1980).
44 See W. EUCKEN, GRUNDSATZE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLrMK 279-285 (1952); Landers, A
Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CH. L. REV.
589, 592-97, 606-07 (1975); Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in
Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 527-29 (1976) (rebuttal to Posner, Corporations, supra
note 35).
45 See Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liablefor the Torts of their Corporations?, 76
YALE LJ. 1190, 1201-1204 (1967).
46 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36, at 107-11; Halpern, Trebilcock &
Turnbull, supra note 36, at 134-35; Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 507.
47 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36, at 107-11; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 36, at 134-35; Posner, Corporations,supra note 35, at 507.
48 BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, § 3.02.1, at 60.
49 id., § 5.02, at 101.
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2. Re-evaluating the Efficiency of the Limited .Liability Rule for
Host Country Subsidiaries-TheBasic Efficiency Trade Off
for Substantive Liability Rules
The allocation of risk is as important to the MNE investment
arrangement with a host country as is the distribution of profit opportunities. Liability rules are one legal device for the allocation of
risk. 50 As a general matter liability is most efficiently assigned to one
who may avoid risk at the least cost. 5 ' This is a combination of three
factors: the cost incurred by alternative risk bearers for monitoring
risks; 5 2 the relative risk attitudes (diversification) of alternative risk
bearers; 5 3 and the legal (opportunity) cost of designing and operat54
ing alternative liability regimes.
An efficient liability regime optimizes the calculus of these three
factors. Monitoring cost and risk attitude patterns shape the comparative risk-bearing advantages of alternative risk bearers. As such
they warrant highly complex and differentiated liability arrangements. Yet, it is futile to try to mirror through liability rules all shifts

and variations in relative risk-bearing advantages. Legal costs mandate a significant reduction of complexity in the design of liability
55
provisions.
Translated into the context of MNE investments in host countries, an efficient allocation of investment risks through liability laws
takes into account the relative risk-bearing capabilities of the MNE
on one side and the host country society and the host country creditors on the other. An efficient MNE liability regime also reflects the
legal cost of designing and operating liability laws in accordance with
highly differentiated risk-bearing advantages.
3. Limited Liability as an Efficient Instrument .of Political Risk
Internalization
As was shown earlier, 5 6 the traditional efficiency explanations
50 Property rules are another alternative. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. &
EcoN. 1, 2-6 (1960).
51 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
517-19 (1961).
0
52 See Posner, Corporations,supra note 35, at 507; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36,
at 99-100; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 36, at 134.
53 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36, at 101; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 36, at 142-143; Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 502.
54 See Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 519-26; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
36, at 110-11; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 36, at 148; R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.6 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

LAW]. See also Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 858-66 (1984).
55 Kraakman, supra note 54, has most convincingly discussed this perennial trade-off
problem. See Kirchner, Okonomische Uberlegungen zum Konzernrecht, 2 ZEITSCHRIF-r F0R UNTERNEHMENS UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 214-34 (1985).
56 See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.

N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 15

for limited liability are hardly satisfactory in the MNE parent/subsidiary context. Yet, there is another, heretofore untested,
proposition that explains the limited liability rule in light of political
risks faced by MNEs in host countries.
Investment risks are not limited to economic risks. In fact, political risks, particularly in foreign countries, are an equally important
factor in the evaluation of investment projects. 5 7 Political risks have
been most visible in connection with expropriations in socialist and
third world countries, but their range is broader. They encompass
risks emanating from government action or inaction that negatively
affect the profit returns to investors. This includes both outright and
"creeping" expropriations. It also covers, for example, failed economic and financial policies and the failure to enforce law and order.
It equally encompasses unexpected legal acts by host country institutions, like the unexpected announcement of new parent liability rules
detrimental to MNE investors.
In effect, limited liability for host country subsidiaries can be
seen as a simple, inexpensive mechanism for the internalization of
economic risks by the MNE and of political risks by the host country.
Limited liability is an upshot of the risk-bearing advantages of MNEs
and host nations.
MNE ownership of host country operations allows for the transfer of capital and technology from home to host countries with minimal

transaction

cost. 58

Ownership

efficiently

includes

the

combination of some form of residual risk-bearing and economic
control. 59 Control, in turn, requires the internalization of risks emanating from the use of control power. Whoever controls a certain
chain of events is in the best position to monitor the risks associated
with such events with the least expense. 60 Hence, a basic case can be
made for MNE parent liability to the extent of the parent's economic
control over its host country subsidiary.
The MNE's control over its host country investment is, however,
not absolute. Third parties, the host country government in particular, have power to influence the value and return of the subsidiary.
These parties are, in principle, the best monitor's of the risks associated with the use of their own power. The situation could efficiently
be balanced by making such third parties liable to the MNE in ac57 Vagts, Foreign Investment Risk Reconsidered: The View from the 1980s, 2 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INVESTMEN" L.J. 1, 1-18 (1987).
58 See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17, at 448-553; WILLIAMSON, supra note

13, at 273-86.
59 Hansmann, A General Theory of Corporate Ownership 4-22 (1987) (Discussion Paper
No. 33, Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics).
60 This is basically Eucken's argument for parent company liability. See EUCKEN, supra
note 44, at 279-85. It is not entirely accurate in that it ignores possible concurrent controls by other actors over the same events and does not take into account risk attitude
differences and legal cost. Id.
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cordance with the suboptimal use of their power. This is in fact done
with private actors who, for example, steal or damage MNE property.
Yet it is not done and hardly can be done at reasonable legal cost for
6
government activity. '
Thus, neither a host country government nor its "supervisor,"
the host country society, will be liable to the MNE for failed economic policies or its inability to maintain law and order. This political risk is not internalized by the host country if no other mechanism
can be employed to this end. It results in undesirable and inefficient
distortion.
Limited liablilty for host country subsidiaries offers a second
best solution to this imperfection. Instead of leaving the political
risk with the MNE, it allocates it partly to the host country. It does
this by conceptualizing the independence of the subsidiary company
from the MNE parent, and by requiring the parent to capitalize the
subsidiary adequately. The subsidiary's capital reflects the economic
62
risk-bearing advantages of the MNE as a shareholder-owner. It
represents the discounted value of those economic risks that are best
borne by the MNE. 63 Thus, the MNE parent company pays for its
relative risk-bearing advantages by placing an ex ante "bond" with
the subsidiary. Denying parent liability beyond the bond amount
shifts the remaining risk to the host country society. Hence, the host
country society bears at least part of the economic and political risk
associated with a MNE investment project for which it is a superior
risk bearer.
A simple example demonstrates this. Suppose a MNE decides to
set up a subsidiary in a host country. Experience indicates and the
host country government affirms that $5 million is adequate capitalization for the planned activities. Solid estimations furthermore suggest that the subsidiary will make profits of $0.5 million annually for
the next five years. No dividend payments to the parent are planned
for this five year period. Due to failed government economic and
trad policies the subsidiary loses money and ends up with assets of
61 The legal cost of controlling government activity through liability law is often prohibitive when it comes to measuring the damaging impacts of economic policies or the
governmental inertia in the enforcement of its laws. To be sure, there are exceptions
where governments are and can be made liable for certain acts, or where government
activity can at least serve as a defense (regulatory compliance defense) to MNE liability.
62 The calculation of the adequacy of capital is difficult and can only be done through
rough approximations; the errors made in the assessment of adequate capitalization by
courts, other public institutions (e.g., administrative agencies) or contract creditors of a
subsidiary do, of course, have to be accounted for as a cost in the social efficiency evaluation of such a system. See Dix, Adequate Risk Capital: The Considerationfor the Benefits of Separate Incorporation, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 478, 484-86 (1958); W. HEMMERDE, INSOLVENZRISIKO
UND GLAuBIGERSCHutrz 277-99 (1985) (Reihe Wirtschaftswissenschaften No. 343).
63 Adequate capital is a function of the business plans and the business volume of a
subsidiary; accordingly, the capital will have to be adjusted in the course of the development of these parameters, e.g., through infusion of new capital or retained earnings.
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$4 million at the end of the third year of its activities. At this point
the subsidiary causes an industrial accident with damages in the
amount of $4.5 million. It files for bankruptcy and defaults also on a
loan of $1 million and salaries in the amount of $0.1 million.
If the government had acted efficiently, the subsidiary would
have commanded assets in the amount of $6.5 million at the end of
the third year. It would, thus, have been able to cover all its liabilities and debt. Because the government failed, the subsidiary went
bankrupt and $1.6 million remains outstanding. By allocating this
loss to the host country society, which is best able to monitor and
control its politics, the risks emanating from host country political
action are partly internalized. 64 This internalization directs the political incentives of the host country towards ISE. 6 5 Thus, permitting
limited liability for host country subsidiaries is efficient as a second
best solution to internalize the political risks stemming from host
country government action and inaction negatively affecting MNE
host country investments.
B.

Efficient Variations to the Limited Liability Rule for Host Country
Subsidiaries

The intended internalization of economic risk by a MNE
through ex ante capitalization can cause inefficiencies through error
in the measurement of adequate capitalization. 66 It can also be upset
by the opportunistic 6 7 or fraudulent use or abuse of the limited liability system by the MNE. 68 The question is whether these factors

justify exceptions to the limited liability rule through the establishment of categories of parent liability. If yes, such exceptions should
64 To be sure, political risks are still borne by the MNE to the extent of its subsidiary
capital. Lowering the initial capitalization requirement could partly accomodate that remaining risk.
65 The efficient redistribution of limited liability risk among host country citizens is
basically a political question for the host country. The host country society can leave the
risks with the respective creditors or share it on a broader scale through public insurance
schemes like unemployment insurance and other social safety mechanisms.
66 The measurement of adequate capitalization can be done ex ante through an administrative screening process and periodic balance sheet tests (as is generally done in the
banking sector) or through court procedures after the insolvency of a subsidiary (e.g., upon
claims to pierce the corporate veil because of inadequate capitalization). See Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concernfor PrudentialSupervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 1299, 1309-11 (1989); Lovett, Moral Hazard,Bank Supervision and
Risk Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 1365, 1379-86 (1989).
67 Opportunism, a breach of contract for example, is a digression from an established
standard of conduct for purposes of maximum self-interest. See WILLIAMSON, supra note
13, at 47-49.
68 See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 36, at 140-42 (warning that "moral
hazard" and "adverse selection" problems, i.e., problems associated with the fact that insured persons will take too little precautions and persons taking appropriate precautions
will not insure if pooled with less careful persons, may lead to the failure of insurance
markets as substitutes for limited liability).
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ideally be narrow and clear-cut so as to preserve the efficiencies of
the limited liability rule.
The predictability and measurability of risks best borne by
shareholders is easiest if the shareholders are presumed to be both
honest (i.e., not fraudulent nor opportunistic) and passive investors.
In this case contingencies associated with the use and abuse of invested assets by the shareholders do not have to be accounted for
when calculating adequate capitalization. It is sufficient if a liability
regime is imposed on directors, officers, and employees. This guarantees proper employment of corporate assets. The mixed system of
limited shareholder liability supplemented by liability rules for those
carrying out the corporate objectives adequately protects creditor
interests.
This presumably efficient combination of ex ante capitalization
and ex post liability mechanisms is disrupted when shareholders,
parent companies in this case, depart from the norm and become
either active investors or dishonest (i.e., fraudulent or opportunistic).
The additional risks created by this potential change in the parent's
activity patterns must be accounted for either by a stepped-up capitalization requirement or by subjecting the corporate parent to adequate liability rules.
The second alternative seems more efficient. Predicting complex future activity and discounting it for purposes of calculating an
adequate ex ante bond is very difficult. The same difficulty exists
with regard to opportunism and fraud by a parent company. 69 Parent
liability, on the other hand, would not involve such disadvantages.
In addition, if it were narrow enough and legally operable, parent
liability could even preserve the advantages of the limited liability
rule as a means to internalize political risks outside the parent liability exceptions.
In sum, the limited liability rule for shareholders may be efficiently supplemented with parent liability rules. These rules penalize parent activity that goes beyond honest or passive investment. In
order optimally to save the advantages of the limited liability rule,
these liability exceptions should be as narrowly tailored and as clearcut as possible. At the same time they must be operable at reasonable legal cost. This calculus suggests three categories of efficient
70
exceptions to the limited liability rule for corporate parents: (1)
69 Unlike private insurance schemes for directors and officers, a consequent ex ante
capitalization mechanism for shareholder activity would also have to include intentional
acts, which would, of course, increase the moral hazard problem exponentially.
70 The case for these liability categories could presumably be made for other types of
shareholders as well and possibly even for creditors of a corporation with a similar influence on corporate affairs as parent companies, like leveraged buyout funds. For a treatement of these issues see Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with its
Debtor, 67 MARQ.. L. REV. 523 (1984).
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abuse of limited liability by a subsidiary to the detriment of subsidiary creditors; (2) dilution or waste of subsidiary assets through interference in subsidiary affairs; (3) direct and separable infliction of
damages on subsidiary creditors through the use of the subsidiary.
In fact, these three categories of efficient parent liability have already
developed or started to develop in various legal systems.
1. Parent Abuse of the Subsidiaty
Where an MNE parent company incorporates a subsidiary in a
host country, capitalizes it adequately, separates its operations from
the rest of the corporate group, and keeps the subsidiary's financial
situation sound and in accordance with its business risk exposure, no
distortion arises from limited liability. However, where a parent
company manipulates these conditions in a fraudulent or opportunistic manner the efficiency of allowing limited liability for the subsidiary disappears.
In principle the lowest cost avoider of foreseeable risk associated with fraud and opportunism is the fraudulent or opportunistic
actor itself. Thus, where a parent company, in order to incorporate
its subsidiary, furnishes misleading information about the value of
the assets paid in kind to the subsidiary, it should bear the risks associated with this fraud. Likewise, when a parent loots its subsidiary by
demanding excessive dividends, it undermines the very premises on
which the host country granted limited liability. The parent company itself should bear the risks associated with such outright opportunism. Where the damages of such conduct can not be measured a
flat disregard of the subsidiary and its liability veil might be the only
and most efficient response.
In practically all international jurisdictions the abuse of a corporate entity by shareholders is recognized as a reason to disregard the
corporate veil. 7 1 It is particularly prevalent in the United States,72
where piercing the corporate veil has, up to this day, remained the
principal legal vehicle to establish parent liability. 73 The U.S. piercing doctrine has, to some extent, also stimulated legal developments
in other countries. 74
71 See OECD, supra note 32, at 8; BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at 605-794.
72 Lowendahl v. Baltimore, 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (1936); Berkey v.
Third Ave., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1928). See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 71-85 (1986);
BLUMRERG II, supra note 33, at 105-136; E. BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA, LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS & DIRECTORS, RIGHTS, DUTnES & LIABILITIES, ch. 20 (1984).
73 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at 136.
74 The comparative work, R. SERICK, RECHTSFORM UND REALITATJURISTISCHER PERSONEN: EIN RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER BEITRAG ZUR FRAGE DES DURCHGRIFFS AUF DIE PERSONEN UND GEGENSTANDE HINTER DER JURISTISCHEN PERSON (1955), which has been
translated into other languages, has had a particular impact on European and also Latin
American countries. Several countries where the piercing doctrine is evident are: Den-

mark, see Clausen, Use of the American Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil.- An Argument in
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The gist of U.S. piercing law is the disregard of a corporate veil
in cases of fraud, absence of corporate formalities, egregious undercapitalization, commingling of assets, and use of control over a corporation to -commit wrong. 75 These categories are wrapped into
various, sometimes interchangeable, metaphors like "alter ego," "instrumentality," and "agency." 76 At least in principle these situations
represent different categories of parent fraud and opportunism in
which the limited liability privilege is undercut in an immeasureable
way.

Even without detailing U.S. piercing law 7 7 or exploring the attempts to expand the piercing doctrine 78 the potential for use of this
doctrine as an efficient legal response to abuses of the corporate limited liability shield is evident. 79 The only issue is the definition of its
proper boundaries. That, in turn, will be easier if the next two cate-

gories of efficient parent liability are treated separately. 80
2.

Dilution or Waste of Subsidiary Assets Through Parent
Interference

The concept of limited liability for subsidiary corporations is
based on the notion of an ex ante capitalization by a passive parent
company that honors the subsidiary's independence. Where a parent company interferes in the affairs of its subsidiary8' distortions
Danish Business Law, 5 Ircr'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 44, 65-69 (1987); Pardinas, The Dilemma of the
Legal Liability of Multinational Enterprises 35-39 (1987) (unpublished at the Harvard Law
School Library). Germany, see Lutter, Die Zivilrechtliche Haftung in der Unternehmensgruppe, 2
ZEITSCHRiFr FUR UNTERNEHMENS UND GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 244, 248-54 (1982); K.
SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 182-93 (1986); Switzerland, see P. FORSTMOSER, SCHWEIZERISCHEs AKTIENRECHT 23-48 (1981); Ebenroth, Zum Durchgriff im Gesellschaftsrecht, 3
SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHA-r 124-36 (1985); England, France, and Argentina, see

Dobson, Lifting the Veil in Four Countries: The Law of Argentina, England, France and the United
States, 35 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 839 (reviewing the corporate law of "piercing the corporate
veil" in these four countries) (1986). See also OECD, supra note 32, at 8.
75 CLARK, supra note 72, at 73.

76 See generally BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, §§ 6.02-.06, at 112-28.
77 See Hofstetter, Parent Responsibility for Subsidiay Corporations: Evaluating European
Trends (1989) (unpublished paper at Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Hofstetter, Europe]
(to be published in INT'L & COMp. L.Q.).
78 Regarding attempts to declare control a sufficient reason to extend liability to parent companies, see BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, § 6.06.1 n.7, at 126. See also Aronofsky,
Piercing the Transactional CorporateVeil: Trends, Developments, and the Need for Wide-Spread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis, 10 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 31, 38-39 (1985). A sweeping
MNE parent liability doctrine is enunciated in In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" Off the
Coast of France on Mar. 16, 1978, 1984 Am. Mar. Cas. 2123, 2181, 2194 (N.D. Ill.July 27,
1984), noted in Bartlett, In Re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz--Choiceof Law and a Pierced Corporate
Veil Defeat the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, 10 MAR. LAW. 1 (1985).
79 See Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 520-24; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
36, at 109-13.
80 This is exactly where current U.S. law seems to fail. It tends to look at piercing law
as a panacea for almost all situations of efficient parent liability, which is a suboptimal
approach. Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77.
81 Some form of parent interference seems to be the rule in the modern MNE, which
is often organized along the divisionalized M-form. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 273-
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follow if the risks posed by such parent activity are not internalized
with the parent as the best monitor of its own acts.
A traditional, though narrow, device belonging to the basic legal
equipment of all market-oriented jurisdictions addresses this category of parent conduct. Fraudulent conveyance law, if applied to
subsidiary/parent transactions, protects the subsidiary's assets
against specific acts of depletion by the parent.8 2 As a finely tailored
set of rules fraudulent conveyance law is, in principle, efficient. Being restricted to remedying damaging consequences of specific acts,
fraudulent conveyance law has efficiency advantages over broadly
sweeping rules like piercing the corporate veil.8 3 Its operability in

the parent/subsidiary context is questionable, however, where the
interaction between parent and subsidiary is intense. The legal
cost8 4 of fraudulent conveyance 'law can become prohibitive under
such circumstances and might justify rule simplification.
Equitable subordination law has attempted such simplification,8 5 but the potential to overreach, to cases of efficient parent
loans8 6 for example, requires a restriction of its applicability to situa-

tions involving some discernible form of impropriety.8 7 This tends to
narrow its scope to cases similar to those subject to piercing or
fraudulent conveyance law.8 8 The value of equitable subordination
as a device to check parent activity seems, therefore, limited. 89
In contrast, efficiency generally requires that all parent activity
that suboptimally affects the subsidiary's capital be put under an adequate liability regime. This necessity exists all the more because the
absence of a takeover market for subsidiary corporations leaves 1ia86; L. LEKSELL, HEADQUARTER-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 128-66 (1981).
82 For a discussion of the United States see BLUMBERG I, supra note 32, at 285-398;
CLARK, supra note 72, at 40-52; for Germany see Konkursorduung §§ 29-42; for Switzerland see Schuldbetreibungs und Konkurs Gesetz Arts. 285-92.
83 Regarding the limitations of piercing law, see generally J. WILHELM, RECHTSFORM
UND HAFTUNG BEI DER JURISTISCHEN PERSON (1981). See also Vagts, Konzernrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten, in DAS ST. GALLER KONZERNRECHTSGESPRACH 39-42 (J. Druey ed. 1988).
84 Legal costs include the direct cost of enforcing a rule and the opportunity cost of

non-enforcement of the rule.
85 See CLARK, supra note 72, at 52-71; see also the development of a similar rule in
German law, Schiessl, The Liability of Corporationsand Shareholdersfor Capitalizationand Obligations of Subsidiaries Under German Law, 7 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 480, 487-88 (1987).
86 See Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 517-18.
87 Taylor v. Standard Gas and Elec. Co., (Deep Rock), 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); CLARK, supra note 72, at 69-71.
88 See CLARK, supra note 72, at 54-55, 65-69; BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at 113-27.
89 Tschaeni, Amerikanische Lehren fiir schweizerisches Konzernrecht?, SCHWEIZERiSCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAS-r 65-78 (1980). See BLUMBERG I, supra note 32, at 365-66 (referring to the
extension of the time limit for voidable preferences as between insiders, which term includes the parent/subsidiary relationship, in § 547(b)(4)(B) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B) (West Stp-. 1990)). An alternative to substituting equitable sub-

ordination law for fraudulent conveyance law would be the shifting of the burden of proof
to the parent company. Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 523.
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bility as the only device to protect the subsidiary assets from dilution
and waste by those in charge. 90 Where the principle of limited liability for subsidiary corporations is strictly followed, despite constant
and pervasive interferences by the parent company in the subsidiary's affairs, serious distortions must arise.
Unlike U.S. law, which seems to suffer under the dominance of a
metaphorically applied piercing concept, 9 ' European laws have developed sensitivity to this issue.9 2 French, Swiss, and proposed EC
law work with a de facto director notion that puts parent companies
93
under the same fiduciary duties as corporate directors and officers.
German law for de facto concerns uses a similar compensation regime. Yet the cost faced by subsidiary creditors to enforce these regimes has been almost prohibitive. The difficulties in designing a
separate subsidiary interest as a prerequisite to defining the parent's
fiduciary duties and the damages incurred by the subsidiary tend to
work in only the most egregious circumstances. Furthermore, the
risks associated with derivative suits by creditors are often too high
to warrant litigation, particularly for smaller creditors. As a consequence, the practical impact of these laws has not been very different
from that of the conceptually more limited piercing doctrine in the
United States. 9 4
Various European concepts, however, have adopted simplified
schemes for highly integrated corporate groups. These can be seen
as an attempt to compromise the described enforcement problems.
Particularly efficient appears
the German parent liability model for
"qualified concerns."'9 5 Where the interaction between parent and
subsidiary corporations becomes so intense as to render them impenetrable for outsiders, the burden of proof about damaging influences on the subsidiary shifts to the parent. Simultaneously,
creditors acquire a direct claim against the parent company. This
solution takes account of the enforcement difficulties associated with
the pure compensation regimes like the de facto director concept.
At the same time it saves the basically efficient
principle of limited
96
liability for even highly integrated concerns.
90 See Meier-Schatz, Uber die Notwendigkeit gesellschafLsrechtlicherAufsichtsregeln, 107 ZEITSCHRIv FUR SCHWEIZERISCHEs RECHT 191 (1988). Alternatively, even though not necessarily more efficient, contractual control or compensation mechanisms exist for proficient
contract creditors, like banks, but they are not available to others, like tort creditors.
91 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, § 6.07, at 130-31.
92 See generally Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77.
93 See id.at 8-9, 13-14, 16-19.
94 Id. at 23-24.
95 Id. at 10-11. See also id.at 6-8 (discussing the regimes for integration and contract
concerns).
96 This is unlike the situation for the integration concern where parent liability attaches per se. See id.at 6-7.
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Direct and Separable Impairment of Subsidiary Creditors by a
Parent

The same efficiency reasons which favor some form of parent
liability for damaging interferences with subsidiary affairs also call
for liability where a parent inflicts direct damages on subsidiary cred-

itors.9 7 The transition between the two categories is in any case con-

tinuous, as the German "qualified concern" doctrine indicates. 98
It is efficient to hold a parent company, like any other third
party, liable for directly damaging acts to subsidiary creditors. The
internalization of such acts through an ex ante capitalization rule creates a massive moral hazard problem. 9 9 Liability rules, on the other
hand, can be fine tuned within the sophisticated structures of contract and tort law. These laws can be flexibly geared to address
shareholder conduct without using the radical approach of piercing.
law. The roles of contract and tort law as supplements to the limited
liability principle have most thoroughly been outlined in German law
by Eckard Rehbinder.' 0 0 Phillip Blumberg has attempted a similiar
approach in the United States. l0 '
Tort law, through such concepts as duty of care, proximate
cause, and damages, lends itself to a differentiated reflection of riskbearing advantages. It can be applied to sanction parent company
conduct by taking account of the degree and type of parent involvement with the subsidiary. At the same time it allows for adjustments
inefficient and unto the particularities of tort creditors as usually
02
compensated bearers of limited liability risk.'
Blumberg refers to the notion of "assumption of duty"' 0 3 as it
has been used by U.S. courts in construing parent liability for workplace security. This concept seems indeed to have potential as a flexible device to get parent activity under efficient liability control.
Another tort law instrument to be used efficiently as a parent
liability mechanism is vicarious liability.' 0 4 Where a hierarchical rela97 Where direct impairment of a creditor's position by parent activity can be established, this is, of course, preferable to compensating the creditors indirectly through making the parent liable to the subsidiary.
98 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36, at 104; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 36, 140-41.
See also A. BOSMANN, KON100 E. REHBINDER, KONZERNAUSSENRECHT (1969).
ZERNVERBUNDENHEIT UND 1HRE AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF VERTRAGE MIT DRIwrEN (1984) (regarding contract and tort supplements in Switzerland).

101 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, §§ 12-19, at 231-325.
102 Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77, at 20.

103 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, § 14.05.2, at 318 ("Good Samaritan" doctrine).
Critical towards the use of this doctrine is Comment, Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine-A ParentCorporation'sDuty to Provide a Safe
Workplacefor Employees of its Subsidiary, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 717, 734-36 (1988).
104 See Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77, at 19-20; REHBINDER, supra note 100, at 52147. See generally Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) (refer-
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tionship between the parent and the subsidiary has been established
the proposal suggests a rebuttable presumption of parent liability for
subsidiary torts. The parent's liability would then be commensurate
10 5
with its involvement with the subsidiary.
Another tort law concept that lends itself to application in the
parent/subsidiary relationship is interference with third party contracts.' 0 6 Similarly, contract law devices protecting the trust of subsidiary creditors on the financial backing of the parent can have
efficiency-promoting effects. They allow for the legal recognition of
behaves as a direct
parent commitments if, for example, the parent
10 7
contractual partner of subsidiary creditors.
French labor law takes that approach. It provides for parent coliability where the parent company involves itself in the employment
affairs of the subsidiary.' 0 8 French law thereby follows the notion
that the subsidiary employees should not be burdened with proving
either the parent's infliction of damages on the subsidiary or their
right to rely on the parent's conduct as an expression of its direct
financial responsibility to subsidiary employees. Given the usually
small claims of employees and their typical risk-bearing disadvantages,' 0 9 this solution is attractive from an efficiency standpoint. 1 0
The Bhopal case demonstrated another potentially efficient application of tort or contract law. In the complaint filed in the United
States,"' Union Carbide was accused of having breached its promise
to the Indian government that it would use state of the art technolring to the following factors which determine the efficiency of a vicarious liability rule: the
superior risk-bearing attitude of the principal as compared to the agent, the easy observability of the agent by the principal, and low enforcement costs against the principal).
Particularly, in light of the high enforcement costs against the subsidiary due to its
potential "asset insufficiency" (cf. Kraakman, supra note 54, at 868-76), the calculas laid
out by Sykes would seem to favor a parent liability rule where the parent can easily observe
subsidiary behavior due to its interference in subsidiary matters.
105 To a limited extent tort law has also taken care of the parent liability problem in,
e.g., U.S. products liability law. A parent can become jointly liable with its subsidiary
where it is involved in the production, marketing, or sale of a subsidiary product.
BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at xlii.
106 BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, § 14.02, at 300-05. See Schluep, Schuldrechtliche Aspekte
der Verleitung zum Vertragsbruch, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR MAX KELLER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 261
(1989).
107 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at 296-300; REHBINDER, supra note 100, at 293-343;
BoSMANN, supra note 100, at 83.
108 Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77, at 14-15.
109 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 52-56 (noting employees particularly high asset
specificity).
110 Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77, at 15. It could be argued, however, that some
form of a parent defense, e.g., a regulatory compliance defense, should be granted at least
for tort claims of employees on the assumption that tort claims are.usually larger than the
wage and severence payment claims of employees. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text (discussing the justification of a parent defense as an efficient means to internalize
political risks). See also infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text (discussing MNE liability
to weak creditor groups).
I See Count VI of the Complaint filed in the United States, supra note 7.
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ogy at its Indian plant. Instead of solving this issue under the inflexible concept of piercing the corporate veil it could be more readily
tackled as a problem of international law 12 or host country contract
or tort law. This would 'allow for flexible case-to-case adjustments,
thereby promoting efficiency.
C. Additional Considerations Regarding the Limited Liability Rule
1. Per Se Parent Liability vis-a-vis Weak Creditor Groups
Weak creditor groups, like consumers and tort creditors, are the
focus of much legal discussion where limited liability is concerned.
The ability of these groups to bear the risks of limited liability is
doubtful. 1 3 These creditor groups tend to be relatively undiversified
individuals whose risk-bearing capabilities compare unfavorably with
those of better diversified corporate groups. In addition, the prohibitively high information costs 1 14 faced by these creditors can prevent
their efficient compensation by shareholders for bearing the risk of
limited liability.
Thus, distortions likely will occur under a rule of limited liability. But per se parent liability vis-a-vis these creditor groups has its
own inefficiencies. First, these creditor groups might not always bear
the risks of limited liability less efficiently than shareholders. 1 5 In
this case, the shareholders would, under a rule of unlimited shareholder liability, face transaction costs, though less severe, in renegotiating the allocation of liability risk. Second, and more important, is
the function of limited liability as a device to internalize political risk.
Abolishing limited parent liability vis-a-vis all weak creditor groups
would diminish the effectiveness of the rule as an efficiency constraint on political acts by host countries.
In the tort area, where the consequences of tort-related government action, e.g., negligent control of hazardous activities, can be
disastrous, the distortion could be substantial. 116 This suggests the
superiority of resorting to lesser forms of parent liability, like vicarious liability, that give the parent a defense in case of proven misconduct on the part of the host country. It likewise strengthens the case
112 See Stoll, Vereinbarungen zwischen Staat und auslndischem Investor, BEITRAGE ZUM AUS152-57 (1982).
113 See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 36, at 145-47; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 36, at 107-09; Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 519-20; BLUMBERG II,
supra note 33, at 74-80; STONE, supra note 72, at 68.
114 Hofstetter, Europe, supra note 77, at 26-27. See Edelmann, Findingthe ProperPlace in
the Common Law for the Man's Contract: An Economic Analysis 1, 1-5 (1989) (an unpublished
paper for Harvard Law School Law & Economics Seminar).
115 Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 520.
116 To be sure, direct governmental liability could sometimes correct the situation.
But the uncertainty of its availability and its correct application by host country courts
involve significant risks and potential inefficiencies, supra note 61.
LANDISCHEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT
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for liability substitutes,1 7 such as administrative controls for hazardous activities, or government ex ante controls of product and work
place safety. " 8
Mandatory insurance schemes are another alternative to prevent
per se parent liability. Insurance could be private 1 9 or public. In a
public scheme the host country society as a whole could be the insurer and the MNE might be obliged to pay adequate premiums
through taxes or other forms of contribution. Unemployment insurance for employees and public health programs foi tort creditors are
examples of such public insurance schemes.
Bankruptcy privileges for tort creditors, consumers, or employees are additional devices to alleviate limited liability risks of weak
creditors.120 Even participatory rights or organizational means given
to weak creditor groups can partially substitute for liability protection. 121 Codetermination, 12 2 unionization for employees, 12 3 and
recognition of consumer organizations can improve the control
mechanisms available to such creditors. They make ex post controls
12 4
through liablility rules less important in certain instances.
117 See Easterbrook*& Fischel, supra note 36, at 114-17 (stressing substitutes such as
minimum capital requirements, mandatory insurance, managerial liability, and regulation).
See also Posner, Corporations, supra note 35, at 520 (suggesting the placement of a "tort"
bond by the shareholders); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 36, at 147-50
(stressing the role of directors' liability as a creditor safeguard); Kraakman, supra note 54,
at 872-76 (scrutinizing the potential of managerial liability and, suggesting that limited
liability as a "bankruptcy insurance" should be evaluated against "the yardstick of alternative private insurance mechanisms").
118 See Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND. J.
EcON. 271, 275-77 (1984).
119 At least for some areas (e.g., tort risks) a private market could be expected to work.
See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 36, at 138-45.
120 To the extent that contract creditors are put behind tort and other privileged creditors in the bankruptcy priority order, they might negotiate for adequate capital for the
preceding creditors, too. Tort creditors would, thus, become "efficient free riders" on the
contract creditors' attempt to internalize risks with the MNE. See Halpern, Trebilcock &
Turnbull, supra note 36, at 131-32.
121 See Coase, supra note 50.
122 See Teubner, Corporate Responsibility, ali Problem der Unternehmensverfassung, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 34-56 (1983).
123 The "Vredling" proposal in the EC purported to give subsidiary employees a right
to be informed about strategic decisions made on the parent company level. Such information rights would, in turn, improve the bargaining position of employees and help prevent such surprises as the "Badger" bankruptcy which involved a sudden closing of a
Belgian subsidiary by a U.S. parent, leaving the employees without financial coverage for
their severance payment claims. For a discussion of the Badger case and the "Vredling"
proposal, see R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1977); R. BLANPAIN, THE VREDLING PROPOSAL: INFORMATION AND
CONSULTATION OF EMPLOYEES IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1983).

124 A certain drawback of participatory rights is their dilution of responsibility and the
concomitant difficulty in the application of liability rules in general. The problem comes
to the surface in connection with parent liability to subsidiary employees under German
law if the employees were themselves represented on the parent board through
codetermination. See V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, KONZERNRECHT 86-90 (3d ed.
1989).
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These functional substitutes for the outright abolition of limited
liability honor the rule as an efficient means of political risk internalization. But they correct some of the distortions arising from the
imposition of limited liability risk on "weak" creditor groups.
2. Different Parent Liability Regimes for Domestic Corporate
Groups?
Limited liability for subsidiary corporations owned and controlled by foreign parent companies is efficient because of its potential for the internalization of political risk by the host country's
political system. The same argument justifies limited liability for
subsidiary corporations owned and controlled by domestic parents.' 25 Even though domestic parent companies are part of the domestic political system, they bear political risk less efficiently than the
domestic political society as a whole.12 6 Furthermore, inefficient liability rules discourage foreign investment as well as domestic investment.' 27 There is, thus, equal reason to protect domestic parent
companies from the burden of bearing political risk by recognizing
limited liability for their subsidiary corporations. In addition, the
economic risk best borne by a domestic parent company is not fundamentally different from that best borne by a foreign parent company. The monitoring cost and risk attitude patterns of foreign
parents are not systematically different from those of domestic par12 8
ent companies.
To be sure, there may be differences in the legal cost of enforcing parent liability rules against a MNE as opposed to domestic
groups. Limited host country jurisdiction, practical difficulties in litigating against a foreign parent company, and complications in the
enforcement of judgments against foreign parents complicate reliance on parent liability rules for the control of a MNE. Yet these
additional costs of enforcement do not necessarily require narrower
parent liability rules for foreign as opposed to domestic parent companies. Increased administrative control over the adequate capitalization of foreign-owned subsidiaries might suffice. 129 Likewise,
125 The argument could be extended to limited liability corporations in general, but
this is not the topic discussed here.
126 Only some form of special domestic social contract, e.g., some compensation
scheme through favorable tax treatment, might justify political risk-bearing by parent
companies.
127 This is increasingly the case in an environment of international financial
deregulation.
128 The MNE's higher monitoring cost due to the greater geographic and cultural distance between the home and host country might, on average, be offset by its better worldwide infrastructure for the control of subsidiary activities.
129 Examples of such control include screening of initial capitalization, dividend payout restrictions, transfer pricing controls, and financial disclosure requirements. See Note,
The Role of India's Foreign Investment Laws in Controlling Activities of MultinationalCorporations,
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liability-prone activities might be closely supervised when carried out
by foreign-controlled subsidiaries. Such alternatives can, thus, put
domestic and foreign parent companies on an equal footing and
30
render their identical liability treatment possible and efficent.
D. Optimizing Substantive MultinationalEnterprise Liability Law
Efficient MNE liability laws are a function of the political and
legal context in which they apply. In theory, the smaller the political
risk faced by the MNE, the less compelling the case for limited liability of its host country subsidiary. Moreover, differences in the legal
rules that substitute for or supplement liability law will influence the
optimal liability regimes applicable to a MNE.
Consequently, optimal MNE liability rules might vary among
different political and legal systems. Leaving the negotiation of MNE
liability rules to the MNE/host country and MNE/creditor markets
will presumably create adequate country-specific or even creditorspecific results. However, given transaction cost barriers in these
markets, host country legislators and courts play a crucial role in
bringing optimal liability regimes to bear.
But legislators and courts, particularly in third world countries,' 5 ' might sometimes be unable to make sophisticated
cost/benefit analyses about efficient MNE liability regimes.' 3 2 In addition, the subtle, structural, or outright suppression of certain creditor interests in host countries might bias MNE liability laws against
such groups as tort creditors and employees. Furthermore, competition among nations for foreign investment could aggravate the situation by spurring a race for the bottom among host nations to the
detriment of such creditor groups.
This situation calls for international standardization through
comparative law, international guidelines, or even international minimal standards. In addition, if MNEs faced similar liability regimes
14 SYR, J. INT'L L. & CoM. 519, 553 (1988); Aranovich & Hewko, Argentine Laws on Foreign
Investments and the Transfer of Technology, 21 INT'L LAW. 379, 394 (1987).
IS0 Equality of treatment between the two types of parent companies has efficiency
advantages because it prevents delineation problems and the potential of distortion
through inadequate differentiation. It also eases the transaction cost of changing from one
category into the other.
131 Herein lies an efficiency-relevant aspect of the often diagnosed inequality of bargaining power between MNEs and third world countries. The "dependencia" school, subscribing to the view that MNEs unfairly exploit their superior power vis-a-vis third world
countries is, however, broader and seems more concerned with distributional than with
efficiency questions. See Encarnation & Wells, supra note 25, 37-39; R. BARNET & R.
MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 137-47 (1974).
132 When it comes to practical law-making, the job will not be easy in any event. Exact
quantifications are not possible. Efficient rules can thus only be designed by way of approximations. Furthermore, in practice every country will, to a certain extent, have to
consider factors other than efficiency in designing and interpreting liability laws. See
Siliciano, CorporateBehavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1820, 182334 (1987).
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across the globe, they would face decreased legal transaction cost.
In fact, the principle of limited liability for subsidiary corporations
and the three categories of efficient parent liability are of such a 3gen3
eral nature that they might fit into most national legal systems.' It
3 4
One
seems worthwhile to attempt such a scheme internationally.
step in this direction can already be seen in the context of the OECD
Guidelines for MNE. 13 5 Starting with the Badger Case, '3 6 the OECD

has issued several opinions defining and interpreting the responsibilities of MNE parents with regard to their host country subsidiaries. 3 7 Though vague, the liability standards enunciated in these
power of MNE parent
opinions attempt to reflect the relative control
38
companies over their foreign subsidiaries.'
IV.

Choice of Law and Procedural Rules as a Reflection of an
Efficient Allocation of Legal Powers and Risks

The host country has a role in the formation and operation of
the liability rules applicable to MNE host country activities. This
host country power adds to the potential for host country opportunism or fraud and, thus, to political risk. In particular, political risk
is inherent in host country authority to create, amend, interpret, apply, and enforce MNE liability rules.
Part III of this Article construed limited liability as a global cap
on political risk faced by MNE host countries. However, limited liability is just second best as a means to internalize political risk. 139
Where more direct ways of limiting separable political risks are available, they are preferable.
Several different choice of law and procedural mechanisms offer
straightforward limitations and checks on the use of legal authority
by host countries. They allow for an efficient allocation of legal powers to host countries along with optimal limitations of political risks.
133 For example, note the large degree of uniformity that already exists in the. area of
corporate liability law today (even including socialist countries, as far as foreign investment is concerned). See supra note 32 and accompaning text.
134 For a discussion of some efficiency implications of international guidelines, see
Wallace, InternatioanlCodes and Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises: Update and Selected Issues, 17 INT'L LAw. 435, 459-63 (1983).
I35 Declaration of 21st June 1976 by Governments of OECD Member Countries on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 132-42.
136 See BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE, supra note 123, at 70-77.
137 See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1986) [hereinafter

OECD GUIDELINES]. See also LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (N. Horn, ed. 1980); Steg, Internationale VerhaltensregelnfuirinternationaleInvestitionen und multinationale Unternehmen, in ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS UND GESELL-

SCHAFTSRECHT 1 (1985); Coombe, MultinationalCodes of Conduct and Corporate Accountability.
New Opportunitiesfor Corporate Counsel, 36 Bus. LAw. 11 (1980).
138 BARTON & FISCHER, supra note 16, at 890-96.
139 Id.
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Comparative Regulatory and Adjudicatory Advantages for
Multinational EnterpriseActivity in Host Countries
1.

The Casefor the Choice of Host Country Liability Law

Apart from third country and international law, host or home
country law will provide the basis for MNE liability. International
Social Efficiency mandates that this choice be made based on comparative regulatory advantages, i.e., the relative ability of the two
countries to design the most effective liability laws at the least
cost. 140

There are various factors, in trade-off relations to each other,
that determine comparative regulatory advantage. First, there are
dynamic factors such as the general competence and speediness of
the respective law-making institutions, and the direct cost of the lawmaking process. These factors do not favor either host or home
country rule in a general sense. Instead, they require a case-by-case
analysis, regardless of the difficulty.
Second, there are static efficiency factors that basically favor
host country liability law as a control mechanism over MNE host
country activities. These factors are more problem-specific. They
are rooted in the fact that MNE host country activities take place
within the general political and legal realm of the host country. The
political and legal system of the host country is closer to the fact
patterns to be regulated. The host country also tends
to regulate the
14
substitute and supplementary areas to liability law.
As a result, it is in principle efficient to let the host country establish liability rules for MNE host country activities.' 42 But the host
country's comparative regulatory advantage for liability law fades as
the home country regulatory advantage increase. Thus, at some
point advantage for regulating MNE liability shifts to the home country. The concept of independent subsidiaries with limited liability
helps ease this demarcation problem. It makes possible a relatively
clear separation between host country activity (i.e., subsidiary activity
140 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 54, at 553-54 (attempting to

put choice of law rules in an efficiency framework); Siehr, Okonomische Analyse des Privatrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KARL FIRSCHING ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 269 (1985) (placing the

choice of law efficiency analysis in an international context).
141 See Hadari, The Choice of National Law Applicable to the National Enterprise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1, 10, 37-39; F. MANN, ZUR STAATLICHEN HOHEITSGEWALT UBER AUSLANDISCHE
ToCHTERGESELLSCHAFTEN UND ZWEIGNIEDERLASSUNGEN
INLANDISCHER UNTERNEHMEN SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 21-28 (1986); Tzou-

ganatos, Private InternationalLaw as a Means to Control the Multinational Enterprise, 19 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 477 (1986).
142 Of course, where dynamic factors disfavor the host country rule because of an un-

able or corrupt law-making process, home country rule might be a more efficient solution.
It is expected that the MNE/host country market, or at least the MNE/creditor markets,
will tend to lead to provisions for the application of host country law in these cases.
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subject to host country law) and home country activity (i.e., parent
activity subject to home country law).
But this simple choice of law concept does not always hold. In
the MNE parent liability area it needs to be supplemented to cover
the cases of efficient exception to the limited liability rule. Yet the
static factors determining comparative regulatory advantage seem to
favor host country law for the regulation of these situations, too.
The host country law-making process is closest to the host country
activities of the MNE parent. It should also be best able to assess
such parent activity in the context of the general control regime over
MNE host country activities. The host country seems, thus, in the
best position to determine the optimal liability sanctions for MNE
parent conduct affecting the host country.
Accordingly, it is efficient to apply host country liability law to
host country activities of both MNE subsidiaries and parent companies. 143 The efficiently restricted liability exposure of MNE parents
for their host country activity also limits the political risk associated
with host country regulatory authority over MNE parents. To be
sure, it does not exclude the potential efficiency of additional safe144
guards against these political risks.
A comparative synopsis of choice of law principles governing the
host country activities of MNEs reveals a partly uneven,1 4 5 yet obvious trend in the direction of the efficiency principles just mentioned.
It is almost uniformly recognized that subsidiary corporations are
subject to host country law. 146 Thus, the limited liability principle, as
well as its foil-piercing the corporate veil-tend to be treated in
accordance with host country law.' 47 Other parent liability excep143 See Behrens, Der Durchgiff ueber die Grenze, 46 RABELS ZErrsCHRInr FUER AusLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 308,

341-48 (1982).

144 See notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
145 U.S. law appears particularly uneven in this area. See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33,

at 615, 642; Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Ashland Oil, 456 F. Supp. 831 (1978).
For criticisms aimed at what is considered an excessive amount of court discretion under
the interest analysis that has come to dominate parts of U.S. conflicts of law see Note,
Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of a Choice of Law Method, 98 YALE
LJ. 597 (1988); Schnyder, Interessenabwdiungim Kollisionsrecht-Zu BrainerdCurries "Government Interest Analysis", 105 ZEITSCHRIFr FUjR SCHWEIZERISCHEs RECHT 101 (1986); Baade,

Multinationale Gesellschaften im Amerihanischen Kollisionsrecht, 37 RABELS ZEiTSCHRIvr F0R AusLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 5 (1973).

Somewhat clearer rules exist in

Continental Europe, e.g., in Switzerland, under the new International Private Law Statute
of 1987. See A. SCHNYDER, DAS NEUE IPR GESETZ 114-19 (1988).
146 The Anglo-American incorporation theory is basically applied in the United States
and Switzerland. See Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (1985);
FORSTMOSER, supra note 74, at 113-14. The Continental European "seat theory" is applied
in Germany.

See G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 365-66 (6th ed. 1987); Tzou-

ganatos, supra note 141, at 479-87. The "seat" theory is one way to prevent externalities
to third countries, where the center of gravity of a subsidiary's activities is different from
its place of incorporation.
147 See BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, § 27.05, at 666; Kozyris, supra note 154, at 64-65;
A. ROHR, DER KONZERN IM IPR UNTER BESONDERER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DES SCHUTZES DER
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tions are, where they exist, often also subject to host country law.
Choice of law principles for German concern law,' 48 Swiss de facto
director law, 14 9 or tort, 150 contract, 15 1 and fraudulent conveyance
law 15 2 generally favor the application of host country law to the host
country activities of MNE parents.
2.

The Casefor Host CountyjtJrisdiction

Apart from third country courts, international courts, and arbi-

tration,'

53

adjudication of MNE liability disputes comes down to a

choice between host and home country jurisdiction. An efficient decision is guided by comparative adjudicatory advantages, i.e., the
ability of the respective court systems to adjudicate a matter in an
54
inexpensive, expeditious, and accurate manner.'
Comparative adjudicatory advantage also consists of dynamic
and static factors. Dynamic factors include the speed, independence,
and competence of the court system, as well as the direct costs of
litigation. These factors do not clearly favor the court system of
either host or home country. Static factors, however, tend to favor
host country over home country jurisdiction for the adjudication of
MNE activities in host countries. First, the actions subject to adjudication primarily occur in the host country. This gives host country
courts better access to evidence and witnesses. Furthermore, if host
country rule governs it can be assumed that host country courts will
15 5
be in a better position to apply and interpret the applicable law.

This efficiency calculus for comparative adjudicatory advantage
MINDERHEITSAKTIONARE UND DER GLAUBIGER, SCHWEIZER STUDIEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN

RECHT 431-58 (1983).
148 EMMERICH & SONNENSCHEIN, supra note 124, at 130, 149-57, 327-28. See
Neumayer, Betrachtungen zum Jnternationalen Konzernrecht, 83 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 129 (1984).
149 INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW STATUTE Art. 155 [hereinafter IPLS].
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 146 (1971) (United States);

BLUMBERG II, supra note 33, at 643 (United States); IPLS Arts. 133-35 (Switzerland);
KEGEL, supra note 146, at 450-61 (Germany).
151 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (United States); BLUMBERG 1I,
supra note 33, at 658-66 (United States); IPLS Art. 117 I (Switzerland); Einf'ihrungsgesetz
zum Biurgerlichen Gesetzbuch Art. 28(I)(1) (Germany); KEGEL, supra note 146, at 426
(Germany).
152 At least in host country courts. See, e.g., IPLS Art. 171 (Switzerland).
153 Some past attempts by MNEs to get exemption from courts in third world countries included submitting to international arbitration for all disputes in connection with
MNE activities in the respective host countries.
154 Attempts to approach jurisdictional issues from an economic perspective are rare.
See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 54, at 517-18; Siehr, supra note
140, at 287-93; Note, An Economic Approach to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Requested by
U.S. Multinational Corporations-TheBhopal Case, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215,
246-51 (1988).
155 Over time host country courts will presumably develop "economies of scale," i.e.,
create a vast body of court made law rendering adjudication easier or in some cases
unnecessary.
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favors host country jurisdiction over host country subsidiaries. The
same reasons also favor host country jurisdiction over MNE parent
companies for the three categories of efficient exceptions to the limited liability principle. In addition, such a rule would allow a consolidation of the often similar liability actions brought against a
subsidiary and its parent.
The restrictions built into the limited liability rule, and the narrow exceptions to it, themselves contain a limitation of the political
risks inherent in host country jurisdiction. Again, this certainly does
not preclude the efficiency of additional safeguards against political
1 56
risks associated with host country jurisdiction.
A synopsis of jurisdictional rules in various countries reveals
that international jurisdiction over the host country activities of
MNEs roughly follows comparative adjudicatory advantages. The
general jurisdiction of host countries over host country subsidiaries
is basically undisputed. 157 Host country jurisdiction over foreign
parent companies, on the other hand, is less uniform. In some countries jurisdiction goes either too far 158 or not far enough from the
perspective of ISE. 59 But parent liability laws are sometimes efficiently accompanied by rules providing for special host country jurisdiction. Examples include Swiss jurisdiction for the adjudication of
de facto director laws' 60 and the almost universally recognized tort
jurisdiction at the location of the occurrence of a tort.' 6 1 The U.S.
minimum contacts doctrine contained in most long-arm statutes allows for case-specific jurisdiction over foreign parent activity in the
United States.' 62 This flexible approach does have the obvious potential to become too broad and unpredictable, but it also may be
fine tuned along efficiency lines. 163
Host country jurisdiction for the adjudication of MNE activities
See notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
157 See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL LAw 139-146
(1983) [hereinafter BLUMBERG III].
158 An example is the German "Vermoegensgerichtsstand" which provides for general
jurisdiction based on any assets within Germany owned by foreign defendants. ZIVIL156

PROZESSORDNUNG

§ 23 [hereinafter ZPO]; V. HERMAN, J. BASEDOW & J. KROPHOLLER,

HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS 314 (1982). Another example,
the Swiss "Arrestgerichtsstand" provides for limited jurisdiction at the location where assets of foreign defendants have been attached. See ILPS Art. 4, supra note 149; SCHNYDER,
supra note 145, at 23-24.
159 See Behrens, supra note 143, at 350.
160 Swiss Code of Obligations Art. 761. See SCHNYDER, supra note 145, at 114-15.

161 IPLS Art. 129, supra note 149 (Switzerland); ZPO § 32 (Germany). See

HERMAN,

BASEDOW & KROPHOLLER, supra note 158, at 344. See also ZPO § 29; IPLS Art. 113, supra
note 149 ("Erftillungsgerichtsstand" in Germany and Switzerland provides for jurisdiction
at the place of contractual performance for contract claims).
162 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1989) (a typical state's long-arm statute).

163 A jurisdictional piercing test comparable to the piercing test under substantive
parent liability law would allow for the proper limitation of host country jurisdiction over

foreign parents. See BLUMBERG III, supra note 157, at 74-76. See also Hay,JudicialJurisdiction
Over Foreign Country Corporate Defendants, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 433-35 (1984); Cohen, In

1990]

329

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE PARENT LIABILITY

in host countries is frequently not exclusive. Broad assertions of
concurrent home country jurisdiction exist for these situations.' 64
This reflects the determination of home countries to protect MNEs
against political risks lurking in host country courts.
3.

Efficient Home Country Checks on Host Country Liability
Laws and Adjudication

The political risk associated with the use of legal powers by host
countries can be countered with various home country measures.
Concurrent home country jurisdiction, 6 5 limitations on the procedural reach of host country procedures (for example, through home
country limitations on legal assistance), refusal to enforce host country judgments in the home country, and public order exceptions in
choice of law rules are some possibilities. 1 66 The potential for their
efficiency follows from the substantial discretion of host countries in
the use of their legal powers over MNE host country activities.
It is plausible that some of these measures are adequate as a
threat to host countries and, thus, as a means to limit and internalize
political risk. Due to their flexibility and narrowness they might be
an optimal supplement to the political risk limitations already in
place. They could, thus, be part of an optimial mix with the safeguards built into the limited liability rule, the restrictions on host
country regulatory and adjudicatory powers, and the potential sanctions against host countries in the MNE/host country market.
On the other hand, the specific home country checks on the use
of legal powers by the host country are costly and they may be over16 7
It
broad. One cost of concurrent jurisdiction is forum shopping.
invites opportunism among plaintiffs and hampers the optimal restriction of home country jurisdiction over MNE host country activities to cases where host country jurisdiction would be less efficient.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, particularly as used by U.S.
courts, seems an ideal measure to fine tune the allocation ofjurisdictional power to host countries on a case-by-case basis. Its use by
U.S. courts in conjunction with the Bhopal case exemplifies this poPersonamJurisdictionOver Foreign Corporations: The Need for a FederalLong Arm Statute, 14 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 59, 73 (1985).
164 Article 59 of the Swiss Constitution provides for exclusive Swiss jurisdiction over
all Swiss (parent) corporations. BUNDESVERFASSUNG Art. 59. This, however, is an extreme
protectionist case.
165 Note, United States Based MultinationalCorporations Should be Tried in the United States
for Their ExtraterritorialToxic Torts, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 651, 670 (1986).

166 Other broader means might be general, political, or economic retaliatory measures. See Hickenlooper Amendment in the United States, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1988);
Vagts, supra note 57, at 12.
167 See Kropholler, Dos Unbehagen am Forum Shopping, in FESTSCHRIvr F0R KARL FIRSCHING ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 165-173 (1985); Juenger & Samtleben, Der Kampf ums Forum, in
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AusLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATERECHT

708 (1982).
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tential.' 68 Weighing private and public interests, as done in the Bhopal case, allows for the inclusion of an international efficiency
calculus measuring comparative adjudicatory advantages. The competence and independence of host country courts, their speediness,
and the efficiency of the substantive law likely to be applied 169 can all
be included in this rationale.
Nonenforcement of judgments is costly in that it might require
repetitive procedures over the same issues in host and home country
courts. Thus, overly broad enforcement restrictions for foreign
judgments will be inefficient. An analogous case can be made for
restrictions on granting legal assistance to host country courts.
The potential for overbroad home country safeguards represents in itself a political risk factor. The possible opportunistic use of
such safeguards by home countries appears as a political risk from
the perspective of host countries and host country creditors. This, in
turn, calls for safeguards in favor of host countries. The exposure of
subsidiary assets to host country jurisdiction, the allocation of certain
legal powers to host countries, and the potential sanctions against
MNEs in the MNE/host country market will give host countries some
comfort, but possibly not enough.
In any case, there is a potential for mutual opportunism and
conflicting assertions of checks on regulatory and adjudicatory powers as between host and home countries. Again, this indicates the
possibility of achieving efficiency gains through harmonization via international law.
B.

Optimizing Choice of Law and ProceduralMultinational
Enterprise Liability Regimes

MNE liability regimes are arrangements that allocate economic
and political risks associated with MNE host country activities
through a combination of substantive liability rules, choice of law,
and procedural regulations. All these legal structures are part and
parcel of an interrelated package that seeks properly to limit liability
for MNEs as well as their exposure to host country laws and courts.
Choice of law and procedural rules are, thus, as much a function of
ISE as substantive liability rules.' 70 The efficient allocation of economic and political risks between the MNE and the home country on
168 See supra note .3 and accompanying text.
169 One commentator contends that the Bhopal decision in the United States was undesirable because it did not include the alleged inadequacy (inefficiency) of Indian liability
law likely to be applied by Indian courts. See Note, supra note 154, at 244-51. The author
maintains that the suboptimal leniency of foreign liability laws should be taken into account when deciding whether to try a case against a U.S. MNE parent in the United States.
Id. The author's argument is correct from the standpoint of ISE, if the foreign liability law
is the product of a failure in the MNE/host country market.
170 See generally C. EBENROTH, KONZERNKOLLISIONSRECHT IM WANDEL AUSSENWIRTSCHAFrLICHER ZIELE (1978).
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one side and the host country and the host country creditors on the
other calls for a basically congruent construction of substantive MNE
liability law, choice of law, and procedural law. MNE liability for host
country activities is efficiently restricted to the subsidiary and three
categories of parent liability exceptions.17 1 These cases are, in principle, efficiently regulated and adjudicated by the host country.
Optimal choice of law and procedural rules, thus, efficiently
build on the substantive MNE liability rules applicable to MNE host
country activities. A narrowly supplemented limited liability rule for
MNE host country subsidiaries entails an adequate limitation of host
country legal powers, too. This restriction might efficiently be
checked by limited additional home country safeguards. These safeguards may potentially overshoot and trigger a vicious circle of legal
conflicts between home and host countries. This, in turn, favors the
harmonization of choice of law and procedural issues in the regulatory market among nations. Treaties covering legal assistance, judgment enforcement, choice of law, and jurisdiction do, therefore, have
a particular efficiency potential. 172 Unlike substantive liability law,
these areas are also less intertwined with other parts of national legal
systems. They lend themselves well to international standardization
73
without prohibitive side effects.'
Choice of law and procedural issues associated with the legal
control of MNE activities in host countries have characteristics favoring flexible solutions in the MNE/host country and the MNE creditor
markets. This is due to the dynamic factors determining regulatory
and adjudicatory advantages. These factors mandate that choice of
law and procedural questions remain subject to amendment on a
case-by-case basis where the absence of significant third party inter74
ests allows such.1
V. Conclusion
The problem of MNE parent liability is multilayered. It consists
of substantive law, choice of law, and procedural levels. An internationally efficient approach to these layers requires a matrix optimizing the allocation of economic and political, including legal, powers
and risks among home countries and MNEs on one side and host
countries and host .country creditors on the other.
171 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
172 They could, e.g., do away with such seemingly exotic devices as the German
"Vermoegensgerichtsstand" or Art. 59 of the Swiss Constitution, or they could help
streamline unpredictable choice of law rules, as they arguably exist in U.S. law.
173 It is, therefore, not surprising that these areas are already broadly covered with
various bilateral or multilateral treaties (e.g., Hague treaties, Brussels Convention and
Lugano Convention among European Countries).
174 This favors default rules as opposed to mandatory rules. See Siehr, Die
Parteiautonomie im Internationalen Privatrecht, in FESTSCHRIFr FUR MAX KELLER ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 485 (1989).
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This global, efficiency equation reveals a common function of
limited liability, the restricted application of host country law and the
limited reach of host country jurisdiction. Further, these devices can
be seen as proper vehicles to limit and internalize the risks emanating from the use of political powers by host countries. Limited corporate liability is a plausible second best solution to internalize
political risks on a general level.' 7 5 The limited application of substantive host country liability law and the limited reach of host country procedural powers are more specific means to curb the political
risks associated with liability legislation and adjudication.
MNE liability regimes are set through an interwoven network of
four key players: the MNE and the home country on one side and
the host country and the host country creditors on the other. The
principal relationship exists between the MNE and the host country.
These two, acting in their own interest and as agents for the home
country and the host country creditors, respectively, negotiate the
liability terms to be applied to the MNE's host country activities.
The MNE/host country market is supplemented by the
MNE/creditor markets and the regulatory market among nations.
Both have the potential to correct some of the imperfections in the
MNE/host country market.
The MNE/host country market and its supplementary mechanisms are assumed ultimately to push MNE liability regimes toward
ISE. These market mechanisms tend to charge a premium to those
actors who defy efficient MNE liability solutions. This is particularly
important to host countries. Their discretion in the use of legal powers over MNE host country activites entails a substantial potential for
opportunism and inefficiency in general. Inefficient MNE liability
laws or judgments can, therefore, be expected to have drawbacks for
the respective countries.
If, for example, an ultimate judgment by the Indian courts in the
Bhopal case had established a parent liability rule in defiance of the
justified expectations of Union Carbide, this might have had farreaching negative implications. MNEs could have reacted to the lost
trust in the Indian adherence to legal principles by diminishing their
Indian investments to suboptimal levels. This would have hurt both
India's long term interests and ISE.
Another example illustrating this proposition is the Deltec decision.' 76 In this case the Supreme Court of Argentina enunciated a
sweeping parent liability doctrine. The Court appeared to subscribe
to a flat disregard of the limited liability principle for MNE subsidiar175 This explains the efficiency advantages of subsidiary corporations over their principle alternative: branch structures.
176 See Compania Swift de La Plata, S.A. Frigorifica, 19 J.A. 579, 151 La Ley 516
(1973).
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ies. 177 This was evidently beyond anything that could reasonably be
expected by MNEs in Argentina.17 8 Partly due to this decision, perhaps, new foreign investment in Argentina came to a temporary
standstill. 17 9 The Supreme Court of Argentina later retreated from
its ruling' 8 0 and enacted a new Code providing for much narrower
parent liability rules.' 8 ' Deltec highlights the role of host country law
as a contract of adhesion between the MNE and its host country. It
indicates the commitment of a host country to adhere to the terms
agreed upon in the MNE/host country market. Such an agreement
might be entirely implicit and consist of the following: An acceptance by the MNE of existing host country substantive law, including
the principle of limited liability for subsidiaries and all liability laws
applicable to the parent (e.g., piercing laws, de facto director laws,
concern laws, tort laws, or fraudulent conveyance laws); an acceptance by the MNE of the host country's choice of law and procedural
rules, subjecting subsidiary and parent to host country rule and jurisdiction in the respective areas; an acceptance by the MNE of subsequent amendments to and interpretations of host country law, such
amendments and interpretations to be carried out within the boundaries of applicable international law (e.g., investment treaties), the
host country constitution, and other pertinent host country laws; and
an acceptance by the host country of the "baggage"' 8 2 imposed on
the MNE by its home country, like judgment enforcement restrictions, or the right of the home country to retaliate against breaches
18 3
of the MNE/host country accord by host countries.
This arrangement between the MNE and its host country binds
both sides equally. A host country will, therefore, not be able to
amend or interpret existing laws without respecting the procedural
or substantive constraints that were implicitly or explicitly negotiated
with the MNE. If it did ignore its commitments unilaterally it would
177 Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parker Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAw. AM. 320
(1974).
178 See BLUMBERG I, supra note 32, at 660-69.
179 The drop in foreign investment was a consequence of general nationalist tendencies in Argentina in the beginning of the 1970s and the rebirth of Peronism. The Deltec
decision, however, did likely play its part in the hostile reactions of MNEs to the Argentine
investment climate at the time. Bruchou, Foreign Investment in Argentina: A ComparativeAnalysis with the Andean Code 7-9 (1985) (unpublished paper at Harvard Law School Library). See
Pardinas, supra note 74, at 39-43.
180 See BLUMBERG I, supra note 32, at 667-68; Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: Deltec
Update, I1LAw. AM. 43 (1979).
181 See Pardinas, supra note 74, 4348.
182 Where such acceptance can not be construed, e.g., because the host country itself
has conflicting rules in force, a battle of forms situation results that bears a high potential
for future conflict and favors solution through international harmonization.
183 The "Calvo" doctrine as espoused by some Latin American countries reflects an
attempt by host countries to demand from MNEs that they waive some of this baggage as a
condition to investing in the respective countries. See D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE (1955);
Shihata, Depoliticization,supra note 19, at 1-3.
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result in a breach of contract. Breaches of contract are basically not
efficient even where the terms originally agreed upon might have
18 4
been suboptimal.
Hence, MNE liability regimes are by no means a phenomenon in
open space. The formal sovereignty of host countries notwithstanding, MNE liability arrangements are not freely manipulable by host
country institutions. Liability regimes are products of world market
mechanisms. They are established through explicit or implicit negotiation processes. Once set they represent a dynamic equilibrium.
The opportunistic disturbance of this equilibrium can cause ineffi85
ciencies like any other breach of contract.'
For host country legislators and courts this means that they must
differentiate between the situation before a MNE host country investment and the situation after approval of an MNE host country investment. The constraints upon a host country in the first situation are
those of the world markets and possibly of international law. The
host country is faced with the problem of finding the market clearing
liability regimes that will optimize its expected benefits from MNE
investments. In contrast, the constraints upon the host country in
the second situation are primarily those of the contract with the
MNE. This might mandate a very different course of action by host
country courts or legislators if called upon to apply or amend MNE
liability laws. 186 A host country's leverage will depend on the terms
of the MNE/host country agreement. Of course, the more specific
these terms, the less the chance and temptation for suboptimal host
country actions and suboptimal MNE, or home country, reactions.
This, in turn, indicates the value of clear and predictable MNE liability regimes, be it in the area of substantive liability law, choice of law,
or procedure.
In sum, MNE liability regimes represent mixes of host, home
country, and international law. They allocate economic and political
risk by way of substantive liability law, choice of law, and procedural
rules. In an attempt to outline a normative framework for such regimes along ISE I showed that the principle of limited liability for
184 Efficient breaches of contract are the exception, certainly not the rule, and would
have to be justified accordingly. See POuNSKY, supra note 31, at 29-32.
185 In these restrictions by world markets and international commitments lies a good
deal of the often mentioned, sometimes lamented, loss of de facto sovereignty of host
countries vis-a-vis MNEs. See R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 95-96 (1971); Rubin, MultinationalEnterprise and National Sovereignty: A Sceptic's Analysis, 3 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1971); Baum, The Global Corporation:
An American Challenge to the Nation State, 55 IOWA L. REV. 410 (1969) (review of the problem
of American-based enterprises penetrating, dominating, and conquering foreign economies from a Canadian and French perspective); Grossfeld, Multinationale Unternehmen und
Nationale Souveraenitaet, 18 JURSTISCHE SCHULUNG 73 (1978).
186 See Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the

European Economic Community and the United States, 6 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 375 (1974)
(discussing issues arising in extraterritorial jurisdiction proceedings).
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MNE host country subsidiaries is basically efficient. But the limited
liability of subsidiary corporations is efficiently supplemented by
three categories of parent liability: abuse of a subsidiary, damaging
parent interference with subsidiary affairs, and direct infliction of
damages on subsidiary creditors by the parent. All these cases of
optimal MNE liability for host country activities are, in principle, best
regulated and adjudicated by host countries. To be sure, narrow and
specific home country checks, like judgment enforcement restrictions, can, if geared to the suboptimal use of these legal powers by
host counries, have additional, positive efficiency effects.

